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Valuation of Indigenous Rights to the Sea Estate 
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Abstract:The Mabo [no. 2] 1992 High Court decision and subsequent judicial decisions indicate a quantum shift in the 
recognising the rights of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders to their sea estates ‘as far as the eye can see’. These 
ongoing changes create a circumstance in which the transfer and trade in rights to fish resources between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous people can be mutually beneficial and the requirement to be able to access damage, loss or diminution of 
rights. 
 
The paper provides a means by which compensation for the diminution or loss of native title rights might be estimated on 
the basis of the opportunity cost of time. Insights are provided into the economic characteristics of the benefits obtained 
from native title rights and how such rights will affect a community’s budget and the choices available. In particular, the 
paper shows that, because of the particular relationship Aboriginal and Torres Strait communities have with their estate, 
and the inclusive nature of community management of the estate, behavioural based methodologies may be applied to the 
valuation of native title rights to non-use cultural values. While it is clear that additional work is required in the application 
of economic methodologies to valuing the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, what is offered here will 
broaden the scope of this work. 
 
   
Introduction 
The  Mabo [no. 2] 1992 High Court decision and 
consequent judicial and legislative actions was a 
quantum shift in the recognition of the rights of 
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders, while the 
Croker Island 1998 decision verified
1 the existence of 
native title rights to the foreshore and marine 
environment. These ongoing changes create 
circumstance in which the transfer and trade in rights to 
fish resources between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people can be mutually beneficial. Economics offers a 
mechanism to do this so that the social benefits of 
resources are maximised.  
 
There is a high level of uncertainty in applying economic 
valuation methodology to the estimation of 
compensatable loss or diminution of native title rights 
and interests under the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) as 
amended in 1998. Unlike those for non-Indigenous uses 
of fish resources, the methodologies for valuing 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander uses are poorly 
developed. This is in part because the legal and 
institutional framework for indigenous rights is still 
being developed and because this issue has received 
minimal attention from economists.  
 
                                                 
1 As discussed later, this is under appeal to the Australian High 
Court. 
This paper deals with the methodological question of 
how this might be calculated, in particular, with the use 
of opportunity cost as a means to estimate non-use value. 
While valuation is discussed primarily in relation to 
those rights recognised under the Native Title Act 1993 
(NTA), the methodology reviewed in this paper are 
generic. In this case, the NTA acts as a constraint on the 
indigenous rights recognised. Or, alternatively it defines 
the recognition space, or the area shared by Indigenous 
law and Common Law (Smith 2000). 
 
The paper consists of two primary parts. The first part of 
the paper provides a brief textural background to native 
title rights in Australia. The second part of the paper 
deals with the question of valuation for purposes of 
compensation under the Native Title Act 1993. The 
reason for discussing valuation in terms of compensation 
is that native title rights are inalienable rights and cannot 
be traded in the open market. Thus setting the need for 
valuation. 
 
Background 
The nature of the relationship of Indigenous people 
with the sea 
In general terms, if not for specific cases, the relationship 
of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders with the 
sea is well documented. The most recent of these include 
(Chapman 1997), Meyers et al (1996), Peterson and 
Rigby (1998), Sharp (1996, 1997), Smyth (1997), and IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Sutherland (1996, see pp. 7-11 for a review of the earlier 
literature), 
 
The texture of this relationship can be complex, as shown 
in Sharp’s (1997) description of the relationship of the 
Meriam people’s relationship with the sea around Mer 
(Murray Islands). Sea holdings are described as similar 
to land holdings and exist on the basis of four principles: 
 
‘firstly, land-sea properties are inherited as a 
sacred trust first and foremost through the spoken 
word; secondly, these rights, which are vested in 
the elder male, entail complementary 
responsibilities to other kin; thirdly, they form an 
interrelated whole with a living habitat which is 
part of culture (not nature); and finally, the 
religious and economic aspects are inseparable, 
thus neither sea nor land is seen simply as a 
resource. The Meriam people carried out 
investments and improvements in the sea including 
extensive stone fish traps, unique little crayfish 
houses out of coral outside their home reef; who 
honour a child’s first fish catch with a personal 
feast; whose totems are sea creatures, sea flora 
and sea birds; where sea analogues form the 
texture of their thought; and who travelled 
northwest to the island of Saibai in double 
outrigger canoes for ceremonial exchange and 
trade’ (p. 29). 
 
Recognition of indigenous rights 
Since European settlement in 1788 and the fiction of 
terra nullius or vacant land, the major legal decisions 
and legislative acts concerning the recognition of 
indigenous rights of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait 
Islanders at a national level are the
2: 
- Racial Discrimination Act 1975 which 
guarantees that no one shall be disadvantaged 
on the basis of race; 
-  Mabo [no. 2] 1992 high court decision 
determined the Meriam people to have pre 
existing common law native title rights to land 
above the high water mark;  
-  Native Title Act 1993 regulates the recognition 
and protection of native title rights. Provision 
was also made for recognition of native title 
claims to the sea; 
                                                 
2 The Queensland Government publication ‘Native Title and 
the pastoral Industry’ presents a good review of the effect 
of native title from the perspective of another primary 
industry. The similarities existing between the Wik and 
Croker Island decisions are worth noting. 
-  Wik High Court 1996 decision establishes the 
coexistence of native title with pastoral lease 
rights; 
-  Croker Island Federal Court 1998 (6 July 1998) 
decision recognised the Croker Island 
community to have pre existing common law 
coexisting native title rights to the sea from the 
high water mark and to the sea-bed of the 
claimed area from the low water mark;  
-  Native Title Amendment Act 1998, confirms 
government powers to regulate marine areas and 
resources, the requirement of compensation in 
‘just terms’ for all future acts in addition to 
those performed by the Commonwealth, and sets 
a cap on the amount of compensation payable; 
and 
-  Tanner High Court 1999 indicates that fisheries 
legislation passed to meet conservation 
requirements may need not have nullified 
customary native title rights. 
 
By April 1998 the National Native Title Tribunal had 
received native title applications from Aborigines and 
Torres Strait Islander people to 140 locations that 
included areas of sea
3. Of these, 73 were in Queensland, 
35 were in Western Australia, 5 were in South Australia, 
11 in the Northern Territory, 11 in New South Wales, 3 
in Victoria, 1 in Tasmania, and 1 (Jervis Bay) in the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
Recognition of sea country under the Native Title Act 
1993 
The  Native Title Act 1993 recognises the possible 
existence of native title to sea and coastal country and the 
preconditions for recognition to occur. According to the 
Croker Island 1998 decision
4, communal native title 
                                                 
3 Based on data supplied by Geospatial Information, NNTT. 
Sea includes any waters seawards of the mean high water 
mark. 
4 An appeal against the Croker Island decision has been lodged 
by the Commonwealth and by the claimants for a hearing by 
the Full Bench of the Federal Court in 1999. The basis of 
the appeal by the claimants include: 
-  the Court misconstrued the evidence and that the exclusive 
nature of the traditional rights apply to both Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal people; ie., that the native title includes 
exclusive rights of possession etc to areas of sea; 
-  the native title rights, on the evidence (of pre-colonisation 
Macassan trading) includes a right to trade in the resources 
of the sea; 
-  the native title includes the rights to minerals; and IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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exists in relation to the sea ‘which washes the shores of 
the relevant land masses’, and sea-bed within the claimed 
area, in compliance with traditional laws and customs for 
any of the following purposes:  
 
‘(a) fish, hunt and gather within the claimed area for 
the purpose of  
satisfying their personal, domestic or non-
commercial communal needs  
including for the purpose of observing traditional, 
cultural, ritual and  
spiritual laws and customs;  
 
(b) have access to the sea and sea-bed within the 
claimed area for all  
or any of the following purposes:  
 
i) to exercise all or any of the rights and 
interests referred to in  
subparagraph 5(a);  
 
ii) to travel through or within the claimed area;  
 
iii) to visit and protect places within the claimed 
area which are of  
cultural or spiritual importance;  
 
iv) to safeguard the cultural and spiritual 
knowledge of the common law  
holders’ (p. 161 iii (a)-(d) as amended by Olney 
J 4 September 1998).’ 
 
Native title gives a right to take fish and shell fish 
without the need for a fishing licence or entitlement in 
those locations in which the native title applies. It does 
not give a right to take fish without a licence or 
entitlement in those areas in which an Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander does not hold a native title right. 
 
The Federal Court also ruled that when inconsistencies 
exist between native title and other rights, native title 
rights must yield or give way to all other legal rights and 
                                                                 
-  the native title is not subject to the public right to enter 
waters and fish, public rights to navigate, or international 
right of free passage (information supplied by the Northern 
Land Council November 1998). 
  The Commonwealth also appealed the decision on the 
grounds that Olney J erred in finding that native title rights 
and interests can be recognised in relation to the sea. 
In 2000, a majority of the Full Bench of the Federal Court 
found against the claimant, while the finding against the 
Commonwealth was unanimous. The decision was appealed by 
both parties to the High Court. 
interests in relation to the sea and sea-bed. In some cases, 
Aborigines peoples and Torres Strait Islanders may 
qualify for compensation for the loss of rights depending 
on when the acts or actions resulting in the loss of rights 
occurred. Following the 1998 amendments, the Native 
Title Act 1993, exclusive native title is limited to the 
landward side of the mean high-water mark of the sea (s. 
26(3)).  
 
Other Acts and policies 
A number of Acts bare directly on the ability of 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders to carry out 
traditional activities relating to fish and marine 
resources. Many of these Acts are in response to 
aspirations of Indigenous peoples to have their traditional 
knowledge and concern with natural resources respected 
through their participation in management regimes (see 
Sutherland 1996). Acts, in addition to the Native Title 
Act 1993, provide recognition of indigenous rights to fish 
resources, including the Fisheries Act 1995 (NT) , the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, 
and the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984. 
 
Under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) 
Act 1976, claimable land extends to the low water mark, 
and may include those reefs and sandbars observable at 
low tide. The Northern Territory administrator may close 
the seas adjoining and within two kilometres to any 
person other than those having an indigenous right to 
enter the area (Aboriginal Land Act 1978 (NT)). Such 
closure does not confer any right of tenure to those with 
an indigenous right to enter the area. The Fisheries Act 
1995 (NT) allows a restricted community license to take 
fish and sell fish within the community. 
 
Currently, under the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984, 
indigenous Torres Strait Islander people: 
-  and indigenous people from Papua New Guinea 
and Australia may take catch as traditional 
fishers for their own use in both Australian and 
Papua New Guinea waters;  
- from Australia may partake in community 
fishing, which gives a restricted right to catch 
and sell fish within the community; or 
-  from Australia may fish using a commercial 
entitlement. The intention of the Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority, which 
administers the Torres Strait, is to combine the 
community fishing and commercial fishing 
entitlements by 1 April 1999. 
 
In addition, some people from Timor have an indigenous 
right to fish in the waters of Ashmore Reef in north-
western Australia. 
 IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Policy documents 
Many State, Territory and Commonwealth fishery 
management authorities have developed policy papers 
that are available to public review. For the States and 
Territories these include the papers by Harding and 
Rawlinson (1996), Loveday (1998) Pyne (1997), and the 
QCFO (1996). Several papers have been written on this 
area from a Commonwealth perspective, including those 
by Sutherland (1996) and Smyth (1997). In addition, a 
number of authorities employ officers with full time 
responsibility for indigenous fish resource use issues and 
to address questions dealing with the accommodation of 
native title within their jurisdiction. A number of papers 
have been published to keep commercial fishers informed 
of the expected effect the Mabo [no. 2] decision may 
have on access to and use of fish resources (eg: 
Beckinsale, 1997, Boileau 1997, Haines and Carpenter 
1998). 
 
 
 
When is valuation likely to be required? 
What is included in the valuation of fish resources used 
by Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait islanders 
depends on the expected use of the valuation results. That 
is, whether the purpose of the valuation is to do with 
maximising the social benefit of fish resources, 
compensation for loss of rights, access to resources, or 
the voluntary sale of rights to another party. 
 
Maximisation of the social value of fish resources 
depends on the alternative uses of the resource regardless 
of who holds right to the resource. In all other cases, the 
valuation of indigenous rights to fish resources will 
depend on legislation and the recognition of rights under 
common law as legislated under the Native Title Act 
1993.  
 
Maximisation of social value 
Maximisation of social value is when value is assessed so 
as to allocate fish resources between competing users and 
uses with the intention of maximising the social benefits 
from resource use. Such valuation need not depend on 
the ownership rights. Such valuation does not depend on 
the distribution of property rights 
 
Compensation 
The basis for compensation is derived from s51 (xxxi) of 
the Australian Constitution, which requires the 
acquisition of property by the Commonwealth to be on 
‘just terms’. The requirement for all States and 
Territories to pay compensation on the same basis comes 
from the Native Title Act 1993.  
 
Grounds for compensation will occur as a result of the 
impairment, or extinguishment of recognised indigenous 
rights. According to the Native Title Act 1993, such 
grounds can be viewed according to whether the actions 
involve ‘past acts (Acts or actions)’ or ‘future acts (Acts 
or actions)’: 
 
•  Past acts are those rights lost due to an act taken 
since the passing of the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 and prior to July 1993 for a legislated Act, or 
before the 1 January 1994 for any other act, 
including, ‘intermediate period acts’ (Native Title 
Act 1993 s. 4(5)), that have arisen in response to the 
Wik High Court Decision 1996.  
 
•  Future acts are those legislative acts that take place 
after July 1993 and any other action that takes place 
on or after the 1 January 1994. Following the 
amendments in 1998 to the Native Title Act 1993, all 
acts offshore are permissible future acts
5.  
 
Compensation for past and future acts is according to the 
conditions set out in division 5 of the Native Title Act 
1993. 
 
Compensation under the Native Title Act 1993 
In Australia, most of the input to the valuation of native 
title rights has been by land valuers such as Whipple 
(1997) and Sheehan and Wensing (1998). However a 
major criticism of their work is it fails to accommodate 
what Neate (1999) describes as the ‘special (even unique) 
features of native title’
6. While this shortcoming in the 
use of land valuation is recognised (Neate, 1999, 
Litchfield 1999), little consideration has been given in 
Australia to the use of alternative methodologies in the 
economic valuation literature
7. Indeed, many, including 
Whipple (1998), believe this conundrum to be best 
resolved by the courts, such, on the basis of judicial 
experience in assessing damages for pain and suffering, 
libel and wanton damage or through the use of a 
solatium.  
 
                                                 
5 Which, of itself, may be a compensatable act. 
6 Smith (2000) discusses the questions and issues in 
conceptualising cultural values for purposes of 
compensation. 
7 The reasons for this are not surprising, while land valuers 
have given this literature a fleeting acknowledgement 
(Whipple 1997), input by Australian economists is 
noteworthy for the low level of participation in this issue. 
Whether this lack of participation by economists is a 
function of the allocation of research funding is another 
question.  IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
 
   5 
A solatium is paid to accommodate the disruption or loss 
of convenience resulting from a loss of rights. It is not 
normally used as a basis for estimating the value of 
benefits forgone as a loss of rights (see Humphry 1999, p. 
93). It may still be appropriate to pay Indigenous 
Australians a solatium for any inconvenience due to the 
loss of native title rights. It is difficult to see, however, 
how such a payment can provide a basis for the valuation 
of the special features of native title rights.  
 
Based on experience in the United States, the economic 
literature indicates that giving up of responsibility for the 
application of economic principles to be done with care. 
Indeed, they have been observed to be arbitrary and 
inconsistent in the application of economic principles to 
Native Americans (Cummings 1991, Cummings and, 
Harrison 1994, Duffield 1997). This literature indicates 
that the payment of compensation for damage to non-use 
environmental values, but has difficulty in accepting the 
application of compensation for any cultural loss suffered 
by Indigenous people as a result of environmental 
damage. Yet, in economic terms, there is little difference 
between indigenous cultural values and environmental 
non-use values Duffield (1997). 
 
As discussed later, the ‘special (even unique) features of 
native title’ are specific to place and to community. In 
response to this, Lavarch and Allison (1998) go to the 
crux of valuing native rights when they observe that only 
the holders of Australian native title rights are in the 
position to assess the value of these rights. That is, value 
depends on consumer sovereignty.  
 
The effect of the economic characteristics of native 
title rights on compensation 
Economic value occurs as a result of preferring an item, 
relative to some other item, and the willingness to go 
without something in order for more of another item (Lee 
1980, p. 12)
8. While many native title rights are not 
traded in the market, the lack of trade does not preclude 
Indigenous Australians from treating the benefits of these 
rights as economic goods (North 1981). For example, 
members of a family group might decide they prefer more 
finfish to kangaroo and forego the hunting of kangaroo to 
spend a day fishing. The cost incurred as a result of this 
                                                 
8The existence of relative value between all goods depends on 
the consumer preferring more to less, being able to rank all 
items according to preference, and being able to compare the 
preferences over all items — that is that preferences are 
transitive. The outcome of agreements made to date indicates 
that these assumptions might be met, although the institutional 
framework in which these agreements occur are often to the 
disadvantage of those holding indigenous rights. 
decision is the expected take of kangaroo, while the 
return is the expected catch of finfish.  
 
A number of economic characteristics important to the 
measurement of economic value can be drawn from this. 
For instance, while economic value depends on scarcity, 
how many and how much there is of an item also 
depends on the existence and enforcement of legal rights 
and the resource characteristics. The amount of benefits 
accruable from these rights can be viewed in economic 
terms as a budgetary constraint, where the constraint 
limits the choices available. That is, all the points along 
the budget line (as shown in figure 1) represent choices 
that are available to a community. Neate (1999) and 
Godden (1999) have expressed concern that the low level 
of an indigenous budget means that indigenous values 
under native title rights will be low. Both authors appear 
to be defining indigenous budgets on the basis of cash 
income. As shown here and discussed later in the paper, 
command over resources and therefore the value of the 
budget, also depends on non-monetary components, 
including those components made available under native 
title rights. An Indigenous community, wishing to 
maximize the benefits obtained, will allocate their 
resources between different uses so that the additional 
benefit from any one use equals the benefit foregone.  
 
The joint nature of native title benefits 
Because of differences in their economic characteristics, 
the methodology used to value native title rights will 
differ according to whether the benefits are material or 
cultural in nature. The intertwining of material uses with 
a community's cultural, spiritual and customary uses 
means these values and their valuation are difficult to 
disaggregate.  
 
From an economic perspective, this jointness in the 
consumption of material and cultural benefits from the 
holding of native title rights corresponds to the joint
9 
supply of  private and public benefits (see Cornes and 
Sandler 1996)
10. Private benefits occur when the benefits 
                                                 
9 When it is not possible to separate the benefits obtained from 
a right, then the expected benefits from that right can be 
described as joint benefits.  
10 The literature on impure public goods refers to the supply of 
public goods as a result of individual supply and 
consumption of private goods. Because the supply of impure 
public goods is expected to increase with expenditure on 
private goods, the supply of impure public goods are likely to 
increase with increases in an individual’s budget. As a 
result, modelling this relationship can be very complex, 
because the marginal private benefits enjoyed by the 
individual consumer do not equal the marginal benefits of 
their supply. This complexity is circumvented in this case, by IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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are exclusive to one person and unavailable to another. 
Within an Indigenous community the direct nutritional 
value from eating a helping of fish is restricted to the 
individual consumer. Public benefits might occur as the 
result of a community’s enjoyment of place or the totemic 
significance of particular species, such as dolphin. In 
large measure, ‘material benefits’ are private goods, 
while cultural benefits are public goods. This 
intertwining of material and cultural benefits in the 
utilisation of native title rights constitutes the joint 
supply of private and public benefits.  
 
While jointly supplied public and private benefits may be 
inseparable, some cultural benefits might be enjoyed with 
little or no explicit input. However, many cultural 
benefits require ongoing investment, such as through the 
use of ceremonies and the sharing of food. In addition, 
the proportions in which cultural and material benefits 
occur, or are provided, may be altered or changed. That 
is, any preference for increased cultural (public) benefits 
can be achieved by giving up activities that have more 
material (private) benefits such as the collection and 
hunting of food, and spending more time carrying out 
activities having higher ritual and spiritual significance. 
The degree to which private and public benefits are 
enjoyed will depend on the use a community makes of its 
indigenous rights, with public benefits being most closely 
linked with cultural uses and private benefits being most 
closely linked with material uses
11.  
 
The capacity to increase cultural benefits is limited as the 
origin of many cultural benefits is unique to place, while 
the marginal increase in the supply of cultural benefits 
with each unit of material benefits foregone will get less 
and less. The situation for material goods is likely to be 
different, as material substitutes can be readily imported 
from outside of the communal estate and lower increase 
in marginal cost.  
 
Consumer surplus 
Consumer surplus is the total benefit enjoyed by 
somebody through the consumption and enjoyment of a 
particular item or activity in excess of the benefits 
foregone or costs incurred. The loss incurred as a result 
                                                                 
internalising the benefits and decisions concerning the 
allocation of an indigenous budget, to the beneficiaries (the 
community group holding the rights). As a result, the 
beneficiary of private and impure public goods is the 
decision maker. That is, the community or family group that 
is the holder of the native title rights. 
11 This breakdown is a simplification as some benefits, that are 
non cultural, such as access to the sea for transport, are 
public good benefits. 
of a diminution or loss of native title rights will depend 
on the uniqueness of the consumable characteristics of 
that item or the supply responsiveness and the 
availability of substitutes. That is, if items of similar 
consumable characteristics are readily available (such as 
beef meat for kangaroo meat
12), there will be little or no 
loss in consumer surplus. If, however, readily available 
substitutes do not exist, as is the situation with many 
cultural icons and the significance of place, much of the 
consumer surplus is lost. That is, to the degree that the 
unit cost of benefits increases and consumption decreases 
with a loss of rights, there is a loss in consumer surplus. 
 
Summing total change in value 
How total change in value is estimated will depend on 
whether benefits are public, private, or there is jointness 
in supply. A unit change in material benefits may affect 
only one individual and is likely to include little if any 
consumer surplus. A unit change in cultural benefits will 
in different ways affect all the members of a community, 
including any impact on adjoining communities. The 
total effect of a loss in benefits due to changes in the 
rights held is estimated by horizontal summing the loss 
of private benefits and adding to this the vertical 
summation of lost cultural or public benefits, including 
any loss in consumer surplus. When joint benefits exist, 
each of the types of benefits is summed. 
 
The economic characteristics of compensation 
The loss of native title rights results in a decrease in a 
community’s ‘budget’ and is therefore a loss of the 
choices and benefits available to a community. While 
both material and cultural benefits are likely to decrease, 
the lack of ready substitutes can, all else equal, result in a 
greater loss of cultural over material benefits
13. 
 
These relationships are shown in figure 1, where the iso 
benefit curve I-I is the highest level of satisfaction 
achievable by a community as a result of their initial 
indigenous budget Bm-Bc, while enjoying 0C and 0M 
cultural and commodity goods. Alienation of part of an 
estate for mining (say), resulting in a loss of amenity and 
                                                 
12 Recognising that there are other elements to the capture and 
consumption of kangaroo meat to a family or community in 
addition to the commodity value, that beef can not supply.  
13 The economic considerations under entry to an Indigenous 
site are similar to the environmental consideration for an 
environmental site described by Krutilla and Fisher (1975). 
Namely irreversibility, substitutability and technical 
progress. In this case, the material benefits have a high level 
of substitutability, which can be expected to improve in 
time with technical progress. Cultural icons however are not 
readily substitutable, while their loss is not reversible.  IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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cultural benefits, decreases the community’s indigenous 
budget. This is shown by a leftward movement of the 
budget to Bm’-Bc’, and the maximum level of satisfaction 
attainable by the community is where the new budget line is 
tangent to the iso benefit curve represented by I’-I’, and the 
enjoyment of 0C’ and 0M’ cultural and material benefits. 
To return the community to their original iso-benefits curve 
(I-I) will involve an increase in the material budget. 
Because of the increase in cultural benefits relative to 
amenity benefits, the budgetary increase involves a pivoting 
of the budget line to B”m-B”c. As a result, there is a 
substantial increase in material benefits to 0M” and a small 
increase in cultural benefits to 0C”. 
 
Figure 1:   The Economic Characteristics of Compensation
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Just compensation may occur when those suffering a loss 
of rights are made no worse off to what they were before 
the loss of rights. It need not require those compensated 
to be able to hold the same bundle of goods before their 
loss of benefits. Indeed, given the nature of many cultural 
benefits being attached to place, in many cases it is not IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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possible to return native title holders to their original 
position. However, as shown in figure 1, it may be 
possible to return a community to the original level of 
‘satisfaction’ enjoyed prior to the loss of native title 
rights (Campbell 1999b).  
 
The quantity of material benefit required to carry out 
compensation will depend on the community’s relative 
preference of cultural 
14 over material benefits (Campbell 
1999a). This requires a lower level of compensation to 
that required to ensure a community has or can afford the 
same mix of material and cultural benefits enjoyed before 
the loss of rights. To observers unaware of cultural loss
15, 
the increase in material benefits might appear to be 
excessive. Such apparent largess can result in claims of 
unfairness from those outside of the holders of native title 
rights. However, while there may be an illusion of 
budgetary increase, in real (utility) terms, there is no 
budgetary increase. 
 
An important point to note from the above, is that the 
valuation of indigenous cultural rights does not assume 
the untwining of cultural and material benefits. All that it 
is assumed is the much weaker assumption that the 
marginal rate at which these benefits are enjoyed can be 
altered.  
 
Estimating compensation 
Two approaches that might be used to estimate individual 
and community values are contingent valuation and the 
estimation of the opportunities foregone. 
 
The possibility of using other approaches, including 
hedonic pricing, travel cost, ordinal ranking and use of a 
non-monetary numeraire of value, are reviewed in 
Campbell (1999a). Others have suggested bypassing the 
question of valuation through the use of a Coasian 
approach (Whipple 1997, Godden 1999). Such an 
approach is unlikely to be applicable in this instance, as 
the assumptions for its application to the loss or 
diminution of native title rights do not exist (Campbell 
1999c). Even if Coase’s assumptions were met, it is still 
doubtful whether it is applicable to a situation in which 
more than two parties are involved (Baland and Platteau 
1996, pp. 49-56). 
 
                                                 
14 That differences exist between clans in the relative weight 
given to the cultural versus the material is implicit in the 
discussion by Sharp (1998, p. 185). 
15 The possible effects of such loss are amply demonstrated by 
the willingness of Native Americans to pay a price greater 
than freehold value for previous tribal lands (Cummings 
1991). 
Contingent valuation  
The use of conceptual markets under contingent 
valuation is the most widely used approach in the 
estimating non-use values. One reason for this is the 
belief that contingent valuation is the only means 
bywhich passive or non-use values can be estimated 
(Adamowicz, Louviere and Williams 1994, Perman, Ma, 
and McGilvray 1996). This general rule has also applied 
to indigenous cultural values. Another reason for 
preferring contingency valuation is non-use data 
collected with this approach is easier to obtain than data 
collected using a behaviourally based approaches 
(Adamowicz  et al 1998).  
 
Debate continues among economists asto the applicability 
of contingent valuation methodology. Arrow et al (1993), 
in their review of contingent valuation note that a 
number of demanding conditions are met. They also 
question the ability of respondents to fully understand 
and give consistent responses to questions involving 
conceptual markets, leading to inconsistencies between 
their responses and observed behaviour. These 
conceptual difficulties are likely to be even greater for 
indigenous people, particularly with regard to the value 
of their cultural rights. This is because many Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander cultural values originate in and 
are specific to place and are mostly located in or are 
proximate to a community’s estate. Such items are not 
traded between communities
16. 
 
While it is questionable whether contingent valuation is 
applicable on its own, it might be applied to specific and 
narrowly defined instances when the conceptual demands 
on the respondent is less demanding.  
 
Opportunity cost of location  
In addition to the material benefits of their estate, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities forego 
benefits obtainable from living off their estate. Such 
benefits might include readier access to commercially 
provided food, easier access to a broader range of health 
and other social services, housing, training and 
employment. By foregoing these benefits, the community 
suffers a loss, which is a cost to them in remaining on 
their estate. For a community wishing to optimise their 
level of wellbeing, the cultural values of remaining in 
place will equal or exceed the foregone benefits. 
Therefore, one approach to assess the value a community 
places on their indigenous rights and responsibilities is to 
                                                 
16 However, there may be intercommunity responsibilities to 
protect and maintain items or features that are also 
important to adjoining communities (McWilliams 1998). IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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assess the value of the opportunities they have foregone. 
This relationship is shown in figure 2. 
 
In the example presented, the optimal outcome is 
achieved at the highest level of satisfaction possible, 
which is achieved when the budget line is tangent to the 
highest attainable utility (benefit) curve. This is shown as 
point ‘W’. At this point, the community enjoys material 
benefits ‘OM’ and cultural benefits ‘0C’. If the 
community were to ‘sell’ their estate and move 
elsewhere, they would increase their consumption of 
material benefits to 0M’ (an increase in material benefits 
of 0M’ – 0M), but would enjoy zero cultural benefits. 
However, outcome, as shown here, will always result in a 
lowering of the overall level of benefits enjoyed
17. This 
loss of benefits is shown in figure 2 by the highest level 
of benefit attainable (indicated by the iso-utility curve 
I’I’) being beneath II. 
 
The monetary value of the optimal amount of material 
benefits and the monetary value of the maximum amount 
of material benefits obtainable can be estimated. In most 
all cases the absolute relationship, 0M’ > 0M and the 
relative relationship 0M’/0M > 0, occur, and the 
monetary value of cultural benefits from holding native 
title rights exceed (0M’ – 0M) 
 
 
The additional information required for a more accurate 
measure of cultural values are to obtain an estimate of the 
rate at which a community will give up material benefits 
for cultural benefits at the point of tangency ‘W’. This 
information will provide a measure of the slope of the 
budget line and can be used along with the data on total 
material benefits data (the point of intersection of the 
budget line with the vertical axis) to draw the budget 
line. This information plus data on the amount of the 
monetary value of material benefits (0M) is sufficient to 
estimate the monetary value of cultural benefits. To do 
                                                 
17 The conditions can also be met by a corner solution where 
the slope of the indifference curve is less than the slope of 
the budget line at all points. Or, alternatively, the slope of 
the indifference curve is greater than the slope of the budget 
line at all points. As a result, tangency between the budget 
and indifference curve will occur on the material benefits 
axis or the cultural benefits axis, depending which of the 
above two possibilities exist. This will result in a corner 
solution and value might be estimated using discrete 
(Freeman1993). It is highly unlikely, however, whether 
these conditions will normally apply in regard to a 
communities indigenous estate, although it might be brought 
about through negotiation. However, a negotiated settlement 
might provide a corner solution. 
this requires an understanding of the makeup of a 
community’s budget line. 
 
Construction of an integrated indigenous-monetary 
budget 
Anthropologists, such as McCarthy and McArthur (1960) 
and Altman (1987) and economists, such as Smith 
(1975), North (1980) and Butlin (1992) assumed 
indigenous communities optimise their economic welfare 
according to a time budget. That is, on the assumption 
that time is allocated between activities such as catching 
finfish or hunting kangaroo or partaking in a cultural 
activity so as to maximise the level of benefit attained by 
the community. The budget in this case can be 
represented as: 
 
B = f(T). 
 
In this relationship, ‘T’ is the amount of working time 
available to the community, the functional term ‘f’ 
accounts for the effect of exogenous variables, such as 
technical and institutional change, natural resource 
availability and variation in environmental conditions.  
 
Because the indigenous estate is managed by the 
community, it is an endogenous to the community and 
should be included in the community’s budget as a 
function of time: 
 
B = f(T(N)). 
 
Although cultural and commodity assets may be supplied 
and consumed jointly, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander communities will make choices in regard to the 
proportion of cultural to material benefits enjoyed. That 
is, on the margin, it is possible for a community to carry 
out activities that differ in the proportion of cultural to 
material benefits. That is, some activities may be 
primarily cultural in nature with little or no direct 
material benefit. Other activities, such as hunting, will, 
by comparison, result in a greater material benefit. 
Because these choices are available to the community, the 
possible flow of benefits from an indigenous estate can be 
represented as separate material benefits ‘Nm’ and 
cultural benefits ‘Nc’: 
 
B = h(T(Nc, Nm)). 
 IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Figure 2:    The Effect on a Community’s Welfare in Maximising their Material Benefits 
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities 
have contact with the monetary based market 
economy
18. Members of a community may obtain 
employment on their estate or go off their estate for 
employment, in addition they may receive social 
transfer payments. Because social transfer payments 
can vary depending on the level of monetary income, 
they are not necessarily a constant and need to be 
considered in conjunction with other sources of 
monetary income: 
 
B = k(T(Nc, Nm, I)).   
 
                                                 
18 Altman provides one of the earliest examples in which the 
choices of an indigenous Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander community between market and non-indigenous 
goods are documented. See Brown and Burch (1992) and 
Duffield (1997) in regard to the ‘mixed subsistence-wage 
economies in Alaskan Native American villages’. 
However, income may be allocated to cultural as well 
as material benefits, such as with the sharing of income 
or the goods purchased with other community 
members, and: 
 
B = k(T(Nc, Nm, Ic, Im)). 
 
Changes in the total amount and the mix of commodity 
and cultural benefits enjoyed by a community will vary 
according to the allocation of time between different 
activities. The optimisation problem for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander communities, then, is to allocate 
their time resources between different indigenous and 
market activities so as to maximise the benefits from 
their budget ‘B’, subject to their time constraint ‘T’: 
 
 Max  U(B) 
  s.t: tNc + tNm + tIc + tIm d T, 
 
where ‘tNc’, is the amount of time allocated to cultural 
activities; ‘tNm’, is the amount of time allocated to the 
production of commodities; ‘tIc’, is the amount of time 
allocated to money earning activities used for cultural IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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activities and ‘tIm’ is the amount of time allocated to 
money earning activities used for material activities.  
 
In a partial equilibrium analysis, the allocation of time 
will be optimal when: 
 
  U’/(Nc’/t’) = U’/(Nm’/t’) = U’/(Ic’/t’), = 
U’/(Im’/t’). 
 
The slope of the budget line shows the rate of 
transformation between cultural and material benefits
19 
and, therefore, the opportunity cost in units of time. As 
time can be used to earn income, it has a monetary 
value. That is, the slope of the budget line provides the 
relative amount of time and therefore the relative price 
of cultural and material benefits. The question is how 
might this be done? 
 
Allocation and valuation of time 
Jointness in consumption infers there is no immediate 
and readily definable answer to the question of how to 
measure the allocation of time to marginal material and 
cultural benefits. However, it is doubtful whether this 
question is insurmountable. For instance, economists, 
with the advice of Indigenous people and the assistance 
of anthropologists might isolate those activities that are 
solely or overwhelmingly for the purpose of obtaining 
cultural benefits or those activities that are solely or 
primarily for material benefits.  
 
Alternatively, the relative marginal importance of 
cultural and material benefits might be obtained using 
contingent valuation methodology. Use of this approach 
in this context would provide data that is more robust 
than which could be provided if addressing the broader 
question of value. Alternatively, respondents need not be 
asked to hypothesis a market nor to estimate willingness 
to pay or accept monetary compensation within that 
market. Instead, members of a community might be asked 
to provide an estimate of the importance of cultural 
benefits relative to material benefits in allocating time. If 
this approach were to be used, the answers provided 
could be checked against observed behaviour rather than 
according to a hypothetical circumstance. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
A number of difficulties in assessing the value of 
compensation from the loss or diminution of native title 
rights on the basis of opportunity cost are not addressed 
in the paper. A major shortcoming of the proposed 
approach proposed is that valuation is in terms of loss of 
                                                 
19 The implicit assumption is that the production possibility 
frontier is linear over the range of valuation. 
native title rights, rather than the diminution of native 
title rights. Locations within a community’s estate will 
differ in the cultural benefits provided and the material 
benefits provided. They will also differ in the cultural 
benefits provided relative to the material; benefits 
provided. Estimation of loss or diminution of native title 
rights needs to accommodate these aspects. 
 
Questions of consumer surplus would need to be brought 
into the analysis. However, once information on the 
overall value of a community’s native title rights to their 
estate is obtained, questions of relative value of different 
locations might be addressed. While there is a possibility 
of strategic behaviour by respondents, information on the 
relative value over a range of sites will allow responses to 
be monitored for internal consistency within the cap of 
overall value. 
 
However, one circumstance where the overall approach 
provided here might be particularly useful is in instances 
where Indigenous people are prevented from carrying out 
and meeting their cultural responsibilities. This is likely 
to be particularly relevant to any loss or diminution of 
native title rights that may have occurred as a result of 
the passing of the 1998 amendments to the Native Title 
Act 1993. How the approach would be applied, and what 
is included in the summation of material benefits 
foregone, however, would depend on the circumstance at 
the time. 
 
In concluding, the paper provides a means by which 
the value of loss due to the diminution or loss of native 
title rights might be estimated according to the 
behaviour of Indigenous communities. Insights are 
provided into the economic characteristics of the 
benefits obtained from native title rights and how such 
rights will affect a community’s budget and the choices 
available. In particular, the paper shows that, because 
of the particular relationship Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait communities have with their estate, and the 
nature of community management of the estate, 
behavioural based methodologies may be applied to the 
valuation of native title rights to non-use cultural 
values. While it is clear that additional work is 
required in the application of economic methodologies 
to valuing the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples, what is offered here will broaden the 
scope of this work. 
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